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The topic today is Women’s Diversity: Legal Practice and Legal Education. I 
should probably tell you, immediately abandoning the literary device of suspense, 
that I consider myself to be a feminist. I know that the organizers of this year’s 
Viscount Bennett Lecture and Seminar are aware of this and will not be surprised 
to hear it publicly confirmed. There are, of course, both male and female 
feminists and I doubt that many members of this audience believe feminism to be 
antithetical to judicial impartiality. However, I am conscious that there are those 
who consider feminism to be an alarming form of judicial bias. In fact, my Chief 
Justice once received a letter of complaint about me from an unhappy litigant, 
following a trial in which he and his sister had disputed entitlement to their 
brother’s estate. In the letter, I was described as a “female Robin Hood” and the 
writer, mistakenly assuming the news would come as a dreadful shock to the Chief 
Justice, declared that, prior to my appointment, I was known to have been a 
“feminist”. The implication was clear: a feminist judge cannot be an impartial 
judge.
Feminism in a judge is not evidence of judicial partiality nor a threat to 
judicial independence. All judges come to the job with life experiences and 
information which they have incorporated into their system of values and into their 
beliefs about how the world works, and how it should work. Judges are not blank 
slates. As Justice Rosalie Abella of the Ontario Court of Appeal has said:
...[N]eutrality and impartiality do not and cannot mean that the judge has no prior 
conceptions, opinions or sensibilities about society’s values. It means only that 
those pre-conceptions ought not to close his or her mind to the evidence and 
arguments presented.1
Because there are often misperceptions and misunderstandings about what 
someone means when they talk about feminism, I find it useful to offer a 
definition of feminism with which I identify, borrowed from the 1992 report of the 
British Columbia Law Society Gender Bias Committee, of which I was a member:
A feminist is a person who believes women and men should be equal participants 
in society regardless of race, ethnic origin, economic background, gender, sexual 
orientation, or disability. A feminist believes women have not yet achieved 
equality in our society and that steps should be taken to correct this situation.
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Lastly, a feminist believes the world should be a comfortable place for women, 
men, and children, free of stereotypes and myths which restrict the roles each may 
assume.2
In this address, I will develop two related themes. The first is that to practise 
law in Canadian courts today, and to be a Canadian judge, is to experience first­
hand the diversity of women in Canadian society and the diversity of that society
— economic, racial, religious, cultural and sexual. The second theme is the 
necessity for all institutions of legal and judicial education, but particularly law 
schools, to incorporate and emphasize the theme of respect for diversity and the 
goal of substantive equality into all curriculum designed for participants in the 
justice system.
The Canada in which I work as a judge today is much different from the 
Canada I knew growing up in the 1950s and 1960s. I was raised and attended 
elementary and high school in a very small town in rural west central 
Saskatchewan with a population of 250. My home town — in fact the whole 
surrounding area — was highly homogeneous even by Canadian standards of the 
time. Nearly everyone was of European descent, mostly second or third 
generation immigrants from Germany. In my village, I was actually considered a 
member of a disadvantaged minority group because my family is not of German 
origin and because we were one of only three or four families in the area who 
were not Roman Catholics. Cultural diversity in most small prairie towns in those 
days was represented by a Chinese-Canadian family, by Hutterite colonists, or by 
members of the Cree Nation, most of whom lived on reserves. A shortage of 
doctors, teachers, dentists, and nurses in rural Saskatchewan communities in the 
mid 1960s did result in a small influx of professionals from India, Pakistan, and the 
Philippines, and some of my first experiences of multi-culturalism involved these 
families.
Even my law school class at the University of Saskatchewan from 1975 to 1977 
was relatively homogeneous — mostly young, mostly white and mostly male — 
although around the time I enrolled, women began to enter law schools in larger 
numbers. In 1975, there was only one woman on the faculty of my law school. 
Although I had professors from a variety of racial and cultural backgrounds in my 
undergraduate commerce classes, I can recall no professors from visible minorities 
in the law faculty. Although issues of gender and racial equality certainly were 
discussed by law students, I can recall no courses dedicated to feminist legal 
theory. A fledgling “women in law” group formed at my law school, but for 
reasons I do not now recall, likely apathy, I never joined. There was some 
consideration of Aboriginal justice issues, and the University of Saskatchewan Law 
School has been instrumental in promoting access to legal education for Aboriginal
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students through its Native Law Centre. Although I cannot be sure, I expect that 
my law school experience does not differ in a significant way from that of most 
judges of my age. My older colleagues experienced a law school environment that 
was even more homogeneous, with only a handful of female students.
I know that the composition of the faculties and student bodies, as well as the 
curriculum, of Canadian law schools have changed a great deal in the eighteen 
years yncp I graduated. In part, I know this because I have had the opportunity 
to participate in programs at the University of British Columbia and University of 
Victoria law schools designed to introduce first year law students to feminist legal 
theory. Participation in recent “call to the bar” ceremonies in my home province 
demonstrates how the face of the legal profession is changing. In British 
Columbia, it is not unusual for half, or even a majority, of the newly-admitted 
lawyers to be women. Nearly one in three British Columbia lawyers is female and 
the number of Chinese-Canadian, Aboriginal, and Indo-Canadian lawyers has 
increased significantly.
The extent to which the law itself has changed may be illustrated by the fact 
that, like me, almost all federally-appointed judges graduated from law school 
before the repatriation of the Canadian Constitution and before there was a 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The constitutional law cases most 
judges studied in law school dealt with the division of powers, not intervention by 
the courts to constrain legislative or executive action inconsistent with the rights 
and freedoms of individual Canadians.
Like law students and the profession, the judiciary is gradually becoming more 
representative of gender and cultural diversity, although the rate of change is 
affected by the formal requirement that federally appointed judges have at least 
ten years experience at the bar and the view of many lawyers that even greater 
experience at the bar prior to appointment may be beneficial. On my court, 
fifteen of the eighty-five full-time judges are women, and six members of the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal are women. Achieving representation on the 
bench for women and men of colour or other minority constituencies has been 
slower but progress has been made, and as the pool of judicial candidates with ten 
or more years at the bar expands this imbalance will be reduced.
I know from personal experience that you cannot sit as a trial judge in Canada 
for very long without recognizing how the diversity of the Canadian population is 
reflected both in the business of the courts and in the backgrounds of lawyers and 
litigants who come before the courts. At a recent workshop organized for 
members of British Columbia courts, we were told that English is the language 
spoken in the homes of only 42% of elementary and secondary school students in 
Vancouver; 31% speak one of the Chinese languages. Every week in our 
courthouse, trials are conducted with the services of an interpreter for one or both
of the parties and several of the witnesses. It is now a routine occurrence for the 
judge and all counsel involved in a case to be female. Like Alberta’s Court of 
Appeal, appeals in our highest court have been heard by all-female panels.
I am proud and pleased that law schools, legal educators, the profession and 
the judiciary have demonstrated recognition of increasing diversity in Canadian 
society, and have begun to respond to the need to adapt Canadian legal 
institutions to accommodate diversity. Few professions, in my view, have 
demonstrated the courage and openness exhibited by the legal profession who, at 
not inconsiderable expense to members of the profession, have established 
committees and task forces to examine gender and racial bias in the profession 
and in the justice system, and to recommend ways to remedy historic and 
persistent inequities. In addition to the studies commissioned by law societies and 
bar associations, law students, law teachers, lawyers and judges have participated 
in federal and provincial studies and projects aimed at eradicating the vestiges of 
gender and racial bias in the Canadian justice system. In a recent address to the 
Australian Legal Convention — the Australian equivalent of the Canadian Bar 
Association -  Alberta Chief Justice Catherine Fraser pointed out that:
There have been no less than fifty-seven national, provincial and territorial reports, 
studies, and articles on gender bias and the law, sixteen which document the 
concerns of the Aboriginal communities about the justice system and eight which 
investigate the effects of racial bias in the Canadian legal system.3
Much has been accomplished, but much remains to be done. It would be naive 
to suggest that legal educators, lawyers or judges have universally accepted the 
conclusions or the recommendations contained in these studies. In fact, the 
strength of denial of the problems may actually explain the number of studies.
There has been some active, but mostly passive, resistance to some of the 
changes proposed or the means by which change is implemented. This should not 
be surprising. Change is difficult and threatening and the pace of change 
demanded of Canadian legal institutions, like that demanded of all Canadian 
societal institutions — political, religious, social and economic — has been rapid and 
relentless. The profession and members of the courts are wounded by what they 
perceive to be, and often is, uninformed or unfair criticism of a system working 
hard to adapt, in difficult circumstances, to a society in rapid transition. More 
change will come but we should not forget that many recommendations made by 
these studies and task forces have been accepted, and many of them have been 
acted upon — by legislators, law schools, lawyers, law societies and bar associations, 
and judges.
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Law firms have moved to address issues of gender equality for a variety of 
reasons. Some of those reasons are purely commercial. Many of the best law 
school graduates are female. Law firms anxious to hire the best and brightest, 
male and female, have been subjected to scrutiny about their employment 
practices. Prospective articling students want to know if firms have written policies 
on parental leave, flexible working arrangements and sexual harassment. They 
want to know about opportunities for promotion; they want to know if a firm has 
a good track record for hiring and retaining female associates. They want to know 
how many female partners a law firm has, how files and clients are assigned, and 
about mentoring and client succession. Law firms also realize that many corporate 
clients have women in senior decision-making roles, including banks and other 
financial institutions. They know these clients expect law firms to reflect the 
diversity increasingly found in the corporate culture. To remain competitive in a 
demanding marketplace, law firms realize that offering high-quality legal services 
means that all their lawyers must demonstrate the ability to adapt and succeed in 
an increasingly diverse economy, where more than 50% of new businesses are 
started by women. Litigators must be prepared to prosecute and defend lawsuits 
in an increasingly complex and global marketplace.
T -ilcp. lawyers, judges recognize the need to adapt to new legal realities. Too 
little is said publicly about the extent to which the judiciary have participated in 
comprehensive and in-depth education programs on social context issues. 
Judiciary-sponsored conferences and seminars with titles like “Judging in a 
Multicultural Era” and “Equality and Human Rights Issues in Superior Court 
Practice” have been attended by Canadian judges for more than a decade. 
Courses designed to promote judicial awareness of and sensitivity to issues 
affecting women, racial and cultural minorities and people with disabilities have 
enjoyed high levels of interest and participation. As Professor Martin Friedland 
has stated in his recent report, “[jjudicial education in Canada has been taken 
seriously by the judiciary.”4
In fact, the Canadian Judicial Council sponsored a course entitled “Aspects of 
Equality: Rendering Justice” in November 1995, largely in response to a 
recommendation contained in the report on Gender Equality in the Justice System 
prepared by the Canadian Bar Association Task Force headed by the Honourable 
Bertha Wilson.5 The faculty for the three-day event included not only judges, but 
also law deans, law professors, journalists and human rights activists.
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There is, of course, an ongoing debate about mandatory judicial education on 
“social context” issues. Without entering into that debate, I note that Professor 
Friedland reported that the National Judicial Institute has been unable to obtain 
funding from government to achieve the objectives, set by judges themselves, of 
ten days of intensive judicial education on appointment and ten days per calendar 
year of continuing judicial education.6 In addition to lack of financial resources, 
the overwhelming case load in many courts makes it difficult forjudges to be freed 
up to attend courses and seminars that are offered.
Although great progress has been and continues to be made in addressing 
inequity wherever it is found within the Canadian justice system, I have been 
disheartened over the past two years to hear from students and colleagues in law 
schools in many parts of Canada that some law students and some law professors 
remain of the view that incorporating issues of diversity and equality into law 
school curriculum is a waste of time — superfluous to basic legal education. I am 
told that courses on feminist legal theory and equality theory are still considered 
by some to be “soft law”, not “hard law” like torts, contracts, and evidence. I am 
dismayed to hear reports from some law schools that students and faculty 
members who promote the integration of equality theory and feminist legal theory 
into the curriculum of so-called “hard law” courses are sometimes ostracized and 
marginalized.
I am troubled to learn of this short-sighted attitude because I know that 
judicial education, as well as legal education, begins in law school. Every judge 
was once a lawyer, and every lawyer was once a law student. I am concerned 
about a lack of interest in or even resistance to legal education about diversity and 
equality because I know, from my own experience as a civil-commercial litigator 
and partner in a large law firm, and from the perspective gained in two and a half 
years on a trial court, that issues raised by sexual, racial, religious, and cultural 
diversity are before the courts every day. These concerns do not arise only in 
Charter litigation or in criminal cases; issues of diversity and equality also arise in 
family law cases and in civil lawsuits of every kind. Sometimes diversity is a 
central theme; sometimes it is only a relevant part of the context in which issues 
are litigated. Judges recognize this and that is why, for example, a paper entitled 
“Equality Issues in Private Law”, prepared by Professor Jamie Cassels of the 
University of Victoria Faculty of Law, was featured at a Canadian Judicial Council 
Seminar in July 1993.7
I will illustrate what I have said with an example. One of the earliest trials I 
was assigned after my appointment in 1993 was a family injuries compensation
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action. A young husband and father had been killed in a car accident. His widow 
and young child came before the court as plaintiffs in an action to recover 
damages for loss of the deceased’s support as income earner, husband and parent. 
The young man had come with his parents and siblings from India to Canada 
when he was a child; his widow was a recent immigrant. All were adherents of 
Sikhism. The assessment of liability was relatively straightforward, but the 
assessment of damages was anything but. Fortunately, both the plaintiffs and the 
defendants were represented by capable counsel, who identified the legal issues in 
their pleadings and presented the evidence necessary to allow the court to apply 
the law in a way which took into account the gender, religion and culture of the 
litigants. Among the issues identified by counsel and presented for decision were 
these:
-  Should the award to the widow for loss of her husband’s future financial 
support be reduced to reflect the contingency of divorce or remarriage or 
both?
-  If yes, should the court minimize the deduction for the remarriage 
contingency in light of expert evidence that in a traditional Sikh household, 
the widow will not remarry without the consent of her father-in-law?
-  If the widow’s award for loss of future financial support was reduced to 
account for the contingency of divorce, should the deduction be reduced 
in light of expert evidence that divorce is relatively rare in the traditional 
Sikh community?
-  Should the award of damages to compensate the widow for the loss of her 
husband’s parenting and homemaking support be reduced in light of expert 
evidence that, in traditional Sikh households, child-rearing and 
housekeeping are almost exclusively the preserve of women?
-  Should the award of damages to compensate the widow for the loss of her 
husband’s parenting and homemaking support be increased because of 
expert evidence that traditional division of tasks in Sikh households means 
that contact with the external world of doctors, teachers, repairers and 
government is almost exclusively the preserve of men?
-  Since the evidence was that the widow would be expected to live with her 
father-in-law or a male relative of her husband, and that they would 
exercise control over any money she had, should the court decline to 
award a sum for professional financial management services?
-  Finally, what effect should the court give to expert evidence that over time, 
assimilation into Canadian society would be likely to modify adherence to 
the traditional cultural and religious practices about which the expert 
witness had testified?
The case I have been discussing is representative, in my experience, rather 
than exceptional. Other examples include a recent case in which a British 
Columbia court awarded $90,000 in damages for loss of future support to parents 
whose twenty-three year old son was killed as a result of the defendant’s
negligence. The court accepted evidence that the Canadian family of Chinese 
origin adhered to the doctrine of filial piety, a tradition whereby adult children pay 
10% to 20% of their income to their parents. The court also awarded the parents 
$7,700 in damages for the cost of a traditional Chinese funeral banquet.
Even in what may be described as purely corporate or commercial cases, issues 
of cultural diversity do arise. In a recent case one of two partners brought 
applications under the Partnership Act and the Company Act to dissolve a 
partnership and wind-up a company. On the hearing of the petitions, respondent’s 
counsel argued that the court should not dispose of the matters summarily, but 
should order a trial of the action. The respondent argued that because he and the 
petitioner were related and both were members of the small British Columbia 
Ismaili community, only a full trial, with oral evidence, would allow him to save 
face as the head of his family and preserve his reputation in the community.
Many equality issues arise in the assessment of damages for personal injuries, 
including the assumptions to be brought to bear in determining pre-injury earning 
capacity in the case of young female plaintiffs. In a number of cases, including 
Arnold v. Teno,8 courts have struggled with the choice of a statistical base to be 
used to assess an award of damages for future loss of earning capacity for an 
infant female plaintiff. Professor Cooper-Stephenson explored this issue in his 
article “Damages for Loss of Working Capacity for Women”,9 and it has been 
addressed more recently by Professor Jamie Cassels.10 The controversy arises 
because statistics reveal that the average earnings of Canadian women in the 
labour force are less than the average earnings of men. To the extent that the 
discrepancy may be attributed to discriminatory employment practices, the use by 
courts of this statistical information to assess damages for female plaintiffs may 
perpetuate systemic discrimination. On the other hand, defendants argue that 
inequality created by systemic discrimination should not be remedied at the 
expense of an individual defendant with the accompanying risk of over­
compensating an individual plaintiff. Another current issue in personal injury 
cases is the assessment of damages for lost or impaired capacity to be a 
homemaker and parent.
While I am an enthusiastic proponent of judicial education, particularly 
education which includes a focus on “social context”, I cannot emphasize too 
strongly that judicial sensitivity and training cannot compensate for a failure by 
counsel to properly analyze, plead and prove matters concerning gender or racial
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equality or cultural diversity arising in a lawsuit. Judges cannot substitute “judicial 
notice” for evidence or compensate, to any significant extent, for a failure by 
counsel to identify the issues and present the appropriate facts and law. As an 
illustration of this point, I recently attended an evening program organized by our 
Law Courts Education Society for judges of the British Columbia courts. The 
program included a tour of a Sikh temple, an informal presentation by a temple 
volunteer about Sikhism and formal presentations by a social worker and a 
provincial court judge, who are both Indo-Canadians, about the culture, religions 
and traditions of people from the Indian sub-continent. Participants were provided 
with written materials and audio-taped lectures to supplement these presentations. 
The program was very useful, but the information I received was no substitute for 
the presentation of expert evidence in the family injuries compensation case I 
described earlier.
If law students and lawyers are not offered, or decline to benefit from, early 
and ongoing training in identifying and analyzing issues presented by women’s and 
increasing societal diversity, the courts and litigants will suffer. These issues are 
complex and difficult, and traditional methodology used in analyzing cases may not 
assist. Part of the complexity results from the fact that, in real lawsuits, issues of 
racial, gender or religious inequality do not separate themselves out into neat, 
water-tight compartments. Instead, legitimate aspirations are often in conflict and 
the courts must make choices between competing interests and competing claims 
brought about by diversity.
Another example, taken from an actual case, is of a woman of Euro-Canadian 
origin who entered into a relationship with a man who had recently immigrated 
to Canada as a refugee. She was a non-practising Christian; he was a practising 
Muslim. Their relationship was stormy. Both were abusive toward the other, but 
the man was the worse offender. When the woman became pregnant, she left the 
man and when their daughter was born, arranged for the child to be adopted by 
a Christian couple. In the custody action brought by the biological father against 
the adoptive parents, his lawyer argued that the father’s cultural and religious 
beliefs should be respected, that blood ties are very important in his culture, and 
that it was in the child’s best interests that she be raised in the religious tradition 
of her father’s community. The biological mother supported the custody claim of 
the adoptive parents. Her lawyer argued that the father’s negative attitudes about 
women, his stereotyped view of the role of women, and his history of violence 
meant that it would not be in the child’s best interests to be raised by him.
This case illustrates that the equality-seeking of groups who have historically 
been legally disadvantaged sometimes conflicts not only with the desire of the 
advantaged to retain their advantages, but also with the aspirations of other 
equality-seeking groups. Similar problems often arise in sentencing for criminal 
offences where courts are concerned to condemn assaults on vulnerable women 
and children in our society, but also recognize that often the offender was himself
a victim of violence as a child. In other situations, where the victim is an 
Aboriginal woman, the offender may also be a member of a First Nation, 
victimized by racial and cultural oppression.
The messages I am trying to convey about women’s diversity, legal practice and 
legal education are not profound. I simply want to emphasize, from where I sit 
on the trial bench, that equality issues are real; they present themselves every day 
in legal practice and in the courts, and they are important. They can and do arise 
in every kind of lawsuit and in every category into which we divide the law and the 
teaching of law -  in tort law, contract law, tax law, administrative law, labour law, 
criminal law, family law, and certainly in the law of evidence and civil and criminal 
procedure.
Judges must continue to educate themselves to increase their awareness of and 
sensitivity to women’s diversity and the context in which decision-making occurs 
in the society that is Canada today. Law schools and continuing legal educators 
must prepare students and lawyers to identify, analyze, research, plead and prove 
the facts and law necessary to permit courts to reach fair and just decisions in the 
context of a diverse society. To do this, legal education, like judicial education, 
will have to incorporate into every part of the law school curriculum a recognition 
of women’s diversity. Equality issues do not arise in a vacuum and specific courses 
on feminist legal theory, racism or equality theory, while important and highly 
relevant, may prove to be insufficient if the theory is not also incorporated into the 
spectrum of curriculum — whether it is curriculum for judicial education, for 
continuing legal education or for law school.
The credibility of and public confidence in Canadian legal institutions depends 
on the creation and maintenance of a fair, equal and accessible justice system — 
one that welcomes, fosters and preserves respect for diversity and equality. Law 
schools play a vital role in this regard in preparing students to become the kind 
of lawyers, and judges, who will ensure that the legal profession and the courts 
continue to maintain the high standards that have made the Canadian justice 
system the envy of many. All Canadians are entitled to expect no less.
